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Expanding Marital Options: Enforcement of
Premarital Contracts During Marriage
Faith H. Spencert

Premarital agreements, though generally enforceable once a
marriage is dissolved, are not enforced while the marriage is still
intact.' The legal ordering of marriage is typically seen as a beginning or an end: The state involves itself only at initiation or divorce. The refusal to adjudicate differences between husbands and
wives during marriage has been referred to as an "axiom" of family
law. This broad assertion that the state will not become involved
while a marriage is intact conceals a number of assumptions about
the structure of marriage and the methods of dispute resolution
within marriage. To say that the state is not "involved" is inaccurate; more precisely, the state chooses to involve itself only in certain ways.
This comment propbses a regime, which may be termed "marital freedom of contract," under which parties to a marriage are
governed by the terms of a private agreement, enforceable at any
time in a court of law; the state's terms for marriage are considered
merely default provisions. The purpose of this comment is not to
argue that premarital agreements are appropriate for all marriages.
Rather, it is to propose that people should be free to reject the
state definition of marriage, describe marriage in their own terms,
and be afforded a forum in which to resolve disputes that arise
under their agreements.
Today, changing conceptions of the roles of men and women,
and of the institution of marriage, suggest that the state should
relinquish its monopoly on the terms of marriage-terms which
may not reflect these changing conceptions. Premarital agreements
allow prospective spouses, based on their own aspirations for their
marriage, to shape and make explicit their obligations to one

t B.A. 1985, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Chicago.
Premarital agreements are also known as prenuptial or antenuptial agreements. This
comment will use the term "premarital agreement." While the term "antenuptial" seems
prevalent in the legal literature, "premarital" is the term by which these agreements are
most commonly understood. It is also the term adopted by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
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another.
This comment is specifically limited to a discussion of premarital contracts between men and women in uncontroversial marital
relationships.2 It will demonstrate that premarital agreements may
be effectively enforced during marriage. Part I argues that, before
the law, marriage can easily be conceived as a contractual rather
than a status-based relationship. Part II surveys the use and enforcement of premarital contracts as a means of dividing and distributing property at the death of a spouse or at divorce rather
than during the life of the marriage. Courts consistently prefer not
to intervene in ongoing marriages for a variety of reasons, many of
which are outmoded and indefensible. In response to the arguments most often advanced in opposition to enforcement of these
agreements during marriage, Part III highlights the benefits of a
marital freedom of contract regime. Part IV illustrates how this
nontraditional regime can be effectively and equitably enforced by
courts using traditional contract doctrines.
I.

MARRIAGE AS CONTRACT

The premise of the argument for the marital freedom of contract regime, though controversial, is that marriage is indeed a contractual relationship. Whether marriage is best described as status
or as contract is the subject of continuing debate. Characterization
of marriage as exclusively status or as purely contract arguably ignores the legal contours of contemporary marriage.' It seems more
accurately described today as a combination of status and contract
which, ironically, lacks the benefits of both. As explained by Pro-

" Viewed from a purely contractual standpoint, "marriage" could include, for example,
homosexual unions which the state currently does not recognize. However, this comment
does not challenge the existing restrictions on the number, age, sex, or blood relation of the
marital parties. For such an analysis, see Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of
Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal L Rev 207, 226 (1982). In addition, the
contract model advanced by this comment may in reality apply to only a limited class of
marriages, such as second marriages or marriages between couples holding significant financial resources. See, for a discussion of the increasing numbers of second and third marriages
with premarital agreements, Ira H. Lurvey, PremaritalAgreements: An Ounce of Prevention-and a Pound of Subsequent Battling (Some Tips and Pitfalls on an Emerging
Trend), 1 Am J Family L 199 (Summer 1987). However, given careful thought and planning,
couples in first marriages and with limited financial resources could benefit from premarital
agreements as well. Furthermore, this comment will not address issues concerning children
as they may affect premarital agreements. The interaction of state policies toward marriage
with state interests in the welfare of children is an important issue, but beyond the scope of
this comment.
3 Harry D. Krause, Family Law, Cases, Comments and Questions 79 (West, 1983).
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fessor Lenore Weitzman:

Marriage has not moved from status to contract. It has
not changed from a relationship based on status-in
which rights and obligations flow from one's position-to
a contractual relationship in which rights and obligations
are freely negotiated by the parties. Rather, marriage has
moved from a status to a status-contract. That is, while
the individuals who enter marriage have the same freedom of choice that governs entry into other contractual
relations, once they make the decision to enter, the contract analogy fails, because the terms and conditions of
the relationship are dictated by the state. The result is
that marital partners have lost the traditional privileges
of status and, at the same time, have been deprived of
the freedom that the contract provides.4
She concludes, moreover, that a move toward a more pure contract
model of marriage would eliminate many of the anachronistic features of modern-day marriage.
Professor Marjorie Shultz explored the implications of the
contractual ordering of marriage and also suggests the privatization of marital relations. She proposes that the state, in response
to contemporary demands on marriage, leave the definition of most
substantive marital rights and obligations to private parties and
intervene only to the extent necessary to "resolve disputes arising
under the privately created 'legislation.' "" According to Professor
Shultz, and Professor Weitzman, as the social consensus on the
meaning of marriage has seriously eroded, the state has relin-

' Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers and the Law xix (The
Free Press, 1981).
IId at xxi.
6 Shultz, 70 Cal L Rev at 212 (cited in note 2). Professor Shultz selected this method of
regulation from a list of several:
Option One: The state might prescribe the substance of the -relationship and also
act as an adjudicator of disputes arising out of those substantive directives.
Option Two: The state might establish the substantive rules of marriage, but refuse any enforcement or dispute resolution between spouses in regard to those
rules.
Option Three [which she recommends]: The state could leave most substantive
marital rights and obligations to be defined privately, but make the legal system
available to resolve disputes arising under the privately created 'legislation.'
Option Four: The state might minimize both roles, refusing to prescribe conduct
within marriage or to resolve marital disputes.
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quished much of the control it once exerted over marriage. Thus,
it is not a significant departure from current regulation of the institution for the state to permit parties to a marriage to define the
terms of their union.
Nor would the enforcement during marriage of agreements
containing these terms require a departure from accepted principles of contract. Professor Shultz predicts that "[e]xisting legal
doctrines should resolve many of the anticipated issues" in enforcement.8 Such issues may require public policy exceptions; however, according to Professor Shultz, these can be ".

.

. carved out

from the arena of private ordering or public dispute resolution"
and can be "developed . . .through .. . the evolving wisdom of

common law adjudication." 9 Thus, common law strictures are
adaptable not only to the characterization of marriage as contract,
but also to the enforcement of marital obligations as contractual
terms.
II.

A.

CURRENT USE AND ENFORCEMENT OF PREMARITAL CONTRACTS

Premarital Contracts Pertaining to Death or Divorce

Premarital agreements are valid and enforceable in certain circumstances. Property arrangements between prospective spouses
historically have been accepted at common law as a way of altering
the marital property regime.1" In the United States, premarital
agreements have long been recognized as affecting the division of
property on the death of a spouse, replacing the state-prescribed
terms on the division of estates."
More recently, courts generally have enforced premarital
agreements regarding property and support arrangements at divorce. A 1970 Florida Supreme Court decision, Posner v Posner,
marked the first judicial rejection of the long-held assumption that
premarital contracts regulating divorce were void as against public
policy."2 The arguments used to nullify such agreements included:
7 Weitzman, The MarriageContract at xx (cited in note 4); Shultz, 70 Cal L Rev at 265
(cited in note 2).
8 Shultz, 70 Cal L Rev at 332.

9 Id.
10Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 309-12 (Little, Brown and Company, 2d ed 1937) (tracing the law's acceptance of property arrangements between prospective spouses to 16th century England).
" Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 Rutgers L Rev
1059, 1066 (1986).
12 Posner v Posner, 233 S2d 381 (Fla 1970).
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that they promoted divorce;1 3 that they commercialized marriage;1 4
or that they turned dependent spouses into public charges. 5 The
advent of no-fault divorce and the corresponding increase in the
numbers of divorces effectively unraveled the first argument. Since
divorce is now viewed as a common occurrence, premarital contracts today may be perceived as not undermining marriage, but as
reinforcing it.' 6 Concerns about "commercializing" marriage have
virtually disappeared.'" The argument relating to the potentially
dependent spouse, however, does continue to play a role in courts'
formulation of divorce provisions. 8
In sum, most jurisdictions recognize premarital agreements regarding the surviving spouse's share in the deceased spouse's estate, homestead rights, exempt property and family allowances,
though a few limit these arrangements on the basis of public policy.' 9 Courts are more reluctant to enforce premarital agreements
controlling disposition of property and support obligations at divorce-again on the basis of public policy concerns20-though a
growing number enforce such contracts ' subject to some

" The general idea was that marriage was forever, and the law should not permit anything that made divorce easier. See Annotation, Validity of antenuptial agreement, or
"companionate marriage" contract, which facilitates or contemplates divorce or separation, 70 ALR 826, 827 ("An antenuptial contract limiting the husband's liability to a certain
sum in case of separation invites disagreement, encourages separation, and incites divorce
proceedings, thereby tending to overthrow and destroy those principles of the law of marriage requiring that the husband and wife live together during their natural life ...").
' Motley v Motley, 255 NC 190, 120 SE2d 422, 424 (1961), quoting Ritchie v White,
225 NC 450, 35 SE2d 414, 415 (1945).
" Fricke v Fricke, 257 Wis 124, 42 NW2d 500, 502 (1950).
" Volid v Volid, 6 IllApp 3d 386, 286 NE2d 42, 46 (1972) ("[i]t may be equally cogently argued that a contract which defines [and protects the financial] expectations ... of
the parties promotes rather than reduces marital stability").
" Few courts mentioned the fear of commercialization of marriage through the use of
premarital agreements. See, for glimpses at this rationale, Motley, 120 SE2d at 424; Ritchie,
35 SE2d at 415. The most that can be said for this argument is that it illustrates courts'
attempts to quickly and superficially dispose of contracts dealing with marital relations.
" See, for an example of a recent adoption of this rationale, Uniform Premarital Agreement Act § 6(b), 9B ULA 369 (Nat'l Conf of Commissioners on Uniform L, 1983) (providing
that a court may order support whenever a provision of a premarital agreement causes one
party to "be eligible for support under a program of public assistance").
'9 See, for example, In re Estate of Meyers, 709 P2d 1044, 1047 (Okla 1985) (premarital
agreement may waive spouse's right to homestead and widow's allowance if there are no
minor or dependent children). For a summary of the requirements in specific jurisdictions,
see Younger, 40 Rutgers L Rev at 1066 n 40 (cited in note 11).
10 See, for example, In re Marriageof Feisthamel, 739 P2d 474, 477 (Mont 1987) (provision in premarital agreement stipulating that property owned by the parties at the time it
was executed could not be considered by a divorce court in awarding support declared void
as against public policy).
21 See, for example, Osborne v Osborne, 384 Mass 591, 428 NE2d 810, 815 (1981) (advo-
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modifications.2 2
B.

Legislative Bases for Premarital Contracts

The rising popularity of premarital contracts has attracted significant legislative attention. To date, fourteen states have adopted
a version of the 1983 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
("UPAA").23 This model act defines premarital agreements as
"agreement[s] between prospective spouses made in contemplation
of marriage and to be effective upon marriage,"2 ' and sets forth
eight subjects upon which the parties may contract. Six of these
concern property and support rights,2 5 one concerns choice of law
governing construction of the agreement,2" and the last provides
for agreement on "any other matter, including [the parties'] personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a

cating "tolerant approach" toward premarital contracts setting property rights of the parties
in the event of divorce). For a summary of cases, see Younger, 40 Rutgers L Rev at 1069 n
52 (cited in note 11).
"' States are divided on the ability of spouses to alter support obligations on divorce by
premarital agreement. California did not adopt the portion of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act which lists modification or elimination of spousal support as a subject for
agreement. See Cal Civ Code § 5312. See also Gross v Gross, 11 Ohio St 3d 99, 464 NE2d
500, 510 (1984) (striking down maintenance provision for wife of $200 per month according
to premarital agreement).
23 Uniform Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA"), 9B ULA 369 (Nat'l Conf of Commissioners on Uniform L, 1983). The fourteen states are: Arkansas (Ark Code Ann § 9-11-401
(1987)), California (Cal Civ Code § 5300 (West 1983)), Colorado (1987 Colo Rev Stat § 14-2301), Hawaii (Hawaii Rev Stat § 572D-1 (1987)), Kansas (1988 Kan Sess Laws § 204), Maine
(19 Me Rev Stat Ann § 141 (1987)), Montana (Mont Code Ann § 40-2-601 (1987)), New
Jersey (NJ Stat Ann § 37:2-31 (1988)), North Carolina (NC Gen Stat § 52B-1 (1987)), North
Dakota (ND Genl Code § 14-03.1-01 (1981)), Oregon (Or Rev Stat § 108.725 (1987)), Rhode
Island (RI Gen Laws § 15-17-1 (1988)), Texas (Tex Fain Code Ann § 5.41 (Vernon 1987)),
and Virginia (Va Code § 20-147 (1983)). Doris Jonas Freed and Timothy B. Walker, Family
Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21 Fain L Q 563 (1988).
2, UPAA § 1(1).
25 § 3(a) of UPAA provides, in relevant part:
Parties to a premarital agreement may contract with respect to:
(1) the rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of
either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located;
(2) the right to buy, sell, use, transfer, . . . dispose of, or otherwise manage
and control property;
(3) the disposition of property upon separation, marital dissolution, death, or
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event;
(4) the modification or elimination of spousal support;
(5) the making of a will, trust, or other arrangement to carry out the provisions of the agreement;
(6) the ownership rights in and disposition of the death benefit from a life
insurance policy ....
" UPAA § 3(a)(7).

PREMARITAL CONTRACTS

2811

statute imposing a criminal penalty. 2' 7 According to one commentator, "it is this [last] provision that provides the flexibility the
drafters believed was essential for modern marriages.""
The UPAA also provides guidelines for the enforcement of
premarital agreements. For example, it explicitly forbids enforcement of agreements which effectively force one party to resort to
public assistance at dissolution of the marriage,2 9 and carefully delineates the conditions under which a party may declare an agreement void.30 However, the Act is notably lacking any discussion of
enforcement of agreements regarding "any other matter, including
personal rights and obligations." Parties are therefore not forbidden by the UPAA from contracting over terms of the ongoing marital relationship and, arguably, are implicitly permitted to do so.1

27

UPAA § 3(a)(8).

" Cynthia Coulter George, Marching to a Single Beat: The PremaritalAgreements Act
Addresses Uniformity, Enforcement and Flexibility, 6 Family Advocate 24, 25 (Winter
1984).
2" UPAA § 6(b) provides:
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal support
and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or
marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility.
" Under UPAA § 6(a), a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party challenging the contract shows that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, that party:
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other party;
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure
of the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure
provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge
of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
The Act also states that "unconscionability," as used in § 6(a)(2), is to "be decided by the
court as a matter of law." UPAA § 6(c).
" The comments to the UPAA are also silent as to the enforcement of this open-ended
provision. One commentator suggests that for this reason the provision should be eliminated
altogether. Younger, 40 Rutgers L Rev at 1089 (cited in note 11). This omission need not be
fatal, however; as legislatures become aware of the demand for agreements concerning ongoing marriages, they may add guidelines to aid courts in what should be a contractual interpretation of these agreements. Lacking guidance from the legislature, courts can turn to
ordinary contract principles for interpretive tools. The official comment to § 6 of the UPAA
notes that "[n]o special provision is made for enforcement of a premarital agreement relating to personal rights and obligations. However, a premarital agreement is a contract and
these provisions may be enforced to the extent that they are enforceable are [sic] under
otherwise applicable law" (citing Avitzur v Avitzur, 446 NE2d 136 (1983)). See also discussion in Section IV.
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C. Judicial Treatment of Premarital Contracts in the Context of
an Intact Marriage
While the language of premarital agreements does not always
confine their applicability to the termination of marriage, courts
consistently refuse to adjudicate disputes between parties to an intact marriage."2 In McGuire v McGuire,33 for example, a wife sued
to force her husband to provide her with adequate money for
household expenses. The court reasoned that, although at common
law a husband has a duty to support his wife, this duty is not enforceable so long as the parties are still married and living together. The court concluded that the continuation of the marriage
gave rise to a presumption of support:
The living standards of a family are a matter of concern
to the household, and not for the courts to determine...
as long as the home is maintained and the parties are
living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his wife and the purpose of the
marriage relation is being carried out. Public policy requires such a holding.3
At least one court has further stated that the husband may dictate
the expenditure of this support. In Commonwealth v George, 5 a
wife unsuccessfully petitioned the court to order her husband to
give her money each month for running the household. The court
considered it the husband's right to determine how "his" money
should be spent. 6
Monetary support is not the only issue with respect to which
courts have refused to intervene during the life of a marriage. Another is the parties' choice of domicile. The court in Isaacs v
Isaacs,7 for example, stated that while premarital agreements may
alter the interests that either the husband or wife take in the property of the other, such contracts may not vary the terms of the
"conjugal relation" 38-the personal rights and duties of husband
and wife. Before the Isaacs married, they agreed to live in Ohio.
After the marriage, however, the husband did not honor his agree32

Joseph W. McKnight, A Friendly Contract, 6 Family Advocate 4, 7 (Winter 1984).

11 157 Neb 226, 59 NW2d 336 (1953).
34 59 NW2d at 342.
"' 358 Pa 118, 56 A2d 228 (1948).
' 56 A2d at 230 ("appellant too strictly controlled the expenditure of his income")
(emphasis added).
99 NW 268 (Neb 1904).
38 Id at 270.
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ment and the wife subsequently sued for desertion. The court, noting that the choice of domicile was the husband's, declined to enforce the agreement and concluded that Mrs. Isaacs demonstrated
not "the faintest conception of her marital duties" by refusing to
follow her husband. 9
Courts have also viewed premarital agreements as inherently
subversive and threatening to the sanctity of the marital institution. For instance, in Mirizio v Mirizio, 0 the court stated that
"public policy on such a vital matter as the marriage contract
should not be made to yield to subversive private agreements and
personal considerations."'" In Motley v Motley the court declared
a premarital contract relieving the husband of support obligations
void as against public policy, warning that the institution of marriage must not be transformed by private agreements into a commercial enterprise.4 8 And in Kilgrow v Kilgrow," the court's refusal
to recognize a premarital agreement was rooted in a rather romantic and idealistic view of marriage. Without looking at the merits of
the parties' agreement, the court summarily dismissed the case,
noting that:
Intervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely serve as a spark to a smouldering
fire ....

One spouse could scarcely be expected to enter-

tain a tender, affectionate regard for the other spouse
who brings him or her under restraint. The judicial mind
and conscience is repelled by the thought of disruption of
the sacred marital relationship, and usually voices the
hope that the breach may somehow be healed by mutual
understanding between the [parties] themselves."8
In general, courts have steadfastly refused to become involved
in intact marriages by enforcing contracts altering the terms of the
marital relationship. Only one case, Sanders v Sanders,4 6 offers an
example of judicial intervention in an ongoing marriage. In Sanders, two former spouses who had been married to each other twice
3' Id.
40
41

242 NY 74, 150 NE 605 (1926).
150 NE at 609. The court further opined that marriage is a "relationship [that] shall

exist with the result and for the purpose of begetting offspring." Id at 607.
42 255 NC 190, 120 SE2d 422 (1961).
120 SE2d at 424, quoting Ritchie v White, 225 NC 450, 35 SE2d 414, 415 (1945).
268 Ala 475, 107 S2d 885 (1958).
107 S2d at 889.
40 Tenn App 20, 288 SW2d 473 (1955).
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before signed a premarital contract prior to their third marriage.
The agreement provided for joint holding of all property and for
the execution of a joint will naming each party the beneficiary of
the other.4 In a dispute over the validity of the contract, occurring
after the parties' third marriage, the court held the agreement enforceable and ordered the husband to convey the property and execute the will as agreed. 48 The court appeared to be swayed by the
importance of protecting and enforcing the rights of the parties,
and of respecting a contract that was fairly negotiated. 9 Still, the
precedential force of Sanders in cases involving premarital agreements concerning obligations of parties to an ongoing marriage
may be limited; the case is distinguishable as involving an agreement that concerned property rights, not the day-to-day conduct
of the relationship.
In considering why courts generally have not become involved
in ongoing marriages, one can identify three main concerns that
have been articulated explicitly, and infer some unstated assumptions. First, at common law, a woman lost her legal identity when
she married and became part of a single legal entity with her husband. This forfeiture of the woman's legal identity had a number
of implications, including: interspousal immunity for tort; the inability of the wife to contract with third parties; the husband's entitlement to his wife's property and, in the event of separation, to
the couple's children.50 While most of the legal disabilities once
suffered by married women have been removed, it is probable that
the conception of husband and wife as a single unit still remains.
For example, the "public policy" referred to by the McGuire
court,5 1 forbidding spouses from bringing disputes prior to the dissolution of marriage, may well be rooted in the common law notion
of husband and wife as a legal unity.
Second, courts generally prefer that parties to a marriage work
things out themselves. The court in Kilgrow hoped that the
"breach may somehow be healed by mutual understanding ....
2
The assumption here seems to be that the intimacy of marriage
compels different treatment from other relations between people
288 SW2d at 474.
48

Id at 480.

' Id at 479 ("[t]here is no intimation in the record that the contract was not executed
in good faith by the parties in the belief that it was valid in all its provisions .... [1it is the
general rule in this state that the law favors the protection and enforcement of rights").
80 Weitzman, The Marriage Contract at 1-3 (cited in note 4).
"1See p 288.
52 Kilgrow, 107 S2d at 889.
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and renders judicial intervention inappropriate. Accordingly, the
court's objective is to force marital disputes into some other forum-the home.
Third, courts fear that their intervention will exacerbate marital problems." It is assumed that, by bringing disputes into court,
parties will "disrupt" the marriage and hasten its end, thereby
frustrating the policy preference for encouraging and protecting
marriage."'
Fourth, judges may have been, and may still be, motivated by
a desire to preserve the traditional family structure as a patriarchal, male-dominated institution. 5 Unquestionably, whether or not
it was stated explicitly, decisions which advocated judicial
5 6
noninvolvement in marriage upheld male power within marriage.
Consciously or unconsciously, judges have been reluctant to upset
one of the most basic forms of subjugation of women by men, that
of the marriage relationship. 7 This fear seems particularly obvious
in Mirizio, where the court warned against "subversive private
agreements; 5 8 contractual alterations to the terms of marriage
have been perceived as too threatening to the empowerment of
men in marriage.
Fifth, a number of courts presupposed "traditional" roles for
the husband and wife: The wife provides nonpecuniary services in
maintaining the household while the husband supports her finans Id ("Intervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely
serve as a spark to a smoldering fire.")
0' See, for example, id ("[i]t may well be suggested that a court of equity ought to
interfere to prevent such a direful consequence as divorce or separation, rather than await
the disruption of the marital relationship").
5 According to Professor Lauerman, "[t]raditionally, the law formed marriage into a
hierarchical/patriarchal institution." Nora T. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriageand at Divorce, 56 U Cin L Rev 493
(1987). See generally Weitzman, The Marriage Contract, ch 1-4 (cited in note 4); R. Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy
(The Free Press, 1979).
See, for example, Commonwealth v George, 358 Pa 118, 56 A2d 228, 230 (1948)
("that the wife is not receiving that degree of control over her husband's income to which
she feels entitled does not establish 'neglect' within the meaning of the law"); Isaacs v
Isaacs, 99 NW 268, 270 (Neb 1904) ([p]laintiff wife was "silly" to think that the premarital
agreement determining domicile was valid; "the general rule is that the domicile of the wife
follows that of the husband").
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 96-97 (Harvard University
Press, 1987) (arguing that the state, by "staying out of marriage and the family" under the
guise of respecting privacy, "subordinate[s] women's collective needs to the imperatives of
male supremacy"); Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 158 (The Free Press, 1987) (claiming that
"marriage is the legal ownership of women" by men).
" See p 289.
0'

57
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cially. The decision in Isaacs" typifies this conception of the husband as breadwinner and wife as helpmate. Furthermore, courts
generally have discounted the economic value of women's contributions to the family. The court in George considered the husband's
earnings exclusively his own, rather than a partnership pool to
which the wife was equally entitled. 0
One court, in a relatively recent decision, ignored the conventional arguments against enforcing premarital agreements during
marriage. In Avitzur v Avitzur,6 1 the court enforced an arbitration
clause included as part of a couple's agreement prior to marriage.
The couple had stipulated in its contract that a religious tribunal
would have authority to resolve disputes between them in the
event of separation. The husband, however, refused to honor his
promise to appear with his wife at the tribunal, as required under
the arbitration clause of the contract. The court, without passing
on what the tribunal might decide, held that the husband must
appear before the tribunal as stipulated in the premarital
62
agreement.
Although Avitzur might be cited as an example of new-found
judicial willingness to intervene in an ongoing marriage, such an
interpretation must be approached with caution. First, the judge in
Avitzur merely enforced the order of an arbitrator. The holding
cannot be read, therefore, as encouraging parties to bring unresolved marital disputes before a court. Second, the dispute concerned the dissolution of the marriage rather than its continuation.
Nevertheless, this case might represent an increased recognition by
at least some courts of private ordering within marriage and an
openness to different methods of resolving marital disputes. 3
Indeed, policy reasons favoring enforcement of contracts during marriage exist and should supersede those invoked by courts in
denying such enforcement. As noted earlier, one rationale used by
courts to stay out of marriage stemmed from a now-outmoded legal
conception of the institution-that is, viewing the husband and
wife as a single entity. The passage in the late nineteenth century

"gSee pp 288-89
" See p 288.

", 58 NY2d 108, 446 NE2d 136 (1983).
446 NE2d at 139.

12

13 See also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Mediation of Marital Disputes Before It Is Too
Late: A Proposalfor PremaritalContract Provisionsfor Mediation of Disputes Within the
Intact Family and at Separation,15 Pepperdine L Rev 51, 58-60 (1987) (citing Avitzur, 446
NE2d 136, to argue for enforcement of premarital contract provisions requiring mediation).
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of Married Women's Property Acts in many states,"' granting married women the right to contract, sue and be sued, undermined
this conception. 5 These acts granted married women greater freedom to deal with third parties without the consent of their husbands. Since that time, the independent legal identities of men
and women, regardless of marital status, have continued to grow.
Thus, today such agreements between spouses are subject to challenge not because the parties are legally incapable of contracting,
but rather because the subject of the contracts "change some essential incident of the marital relationship in a way detrimental to
the public interest."6 6 It is hard to see, however, how premarital
6 7
agreements operate to frustrate public policy by their very terms.
Such contracts do not replace state regulation of marriage, but
only modify some of its terms according to the parties' wishes.
The second argument courts use against enforcement-that
marital disputes belong in some forum other than a court, such as
before a marriage counselor-is also flawed. Critics of judicial handling of marital disagreements might contend that a court is illequipped to handle issues of a psychological or emotional nature.
While this may be true, courts nonetheless are designated the arbiters of disputes of nearly every variety, whether or not they can be
discussed in purely objective terms." In any event, only parties
who have made specific contracts will bring disputes to court. The
enforcement of premarital contracts does not mean that on the
spur of the moment, in a fit of anger, any disgruntled husband or
wife will approach the court to resolve a problem; rather, he or she
will ask the court to interpret the terms of a contract. Courts are
well-equipped to do this.
Perhaps implicit in the argument that courts are not the
proper forum for such disputes is an assumption that marital disagreements are not important enough to warrant the time and expense they consume. This assumption fails to acknowledge that the
enforcement of any contract expends judicial resources. Thus, pre-

" See generally Elizabeth B. Warbasse, The Changing Legal Rights of Married
Women, 1800-1861 137-247 (Garland Publishing, 1987).
" Weitzman, The Marriage Contract at 2 (cited in note 4).
60 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 190 (ALI 1981).
" Unless, of course, the contract includes provisions for sexual services or illegal activities. See Marvin v Marvin, 122 Cal App 3d 871, 557 P2d 106, 112 (1981) ("a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon
the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services").
18Examples of such disputes include actions for wrongful death, loss of consortium and
infliction of emotional distress.
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marital contracts cannot be distinguished from other contracts on
this basis.
There is, however, a compelling reason to distinguish premarital agreements from other contracts: The state considers marriage
an important institution which deserves protection. In view of this
policy preference, courts have a compelling reason to become involved in marriage before it has reached the point where it must be
dissolved. With rising divorce rates, and disturbing studies on the
impact of divorce on children of divorced parents," it behooves the
state to explore alternatives which might help marital partners resolve differences. Statistics further indicate that divorced women
suffer systematic economic disadvantages. 70 If courts indeed are
7
concerned about women becoming dependent on state subsidies '
and to the extent that marriage is desirable for reasons of economic stability, the state should encourage any policy which may
allow marriage partners to resolve differences without resorting to
divorce.
A third objection to enforcement of premarital contracts centers on fears that judicial involvement will doom shaky, but intact,
marriages to divorce. This argument fails due to the presumed consensual nature of premarital contracts.72 If parties make such
agreements with full knowledge that they are judicially enforceable, there is no reason to believe that their ultimate enforcement
will "break up" a happy marriage. There is always the possibility
that the marriage may disintegrate after judicial enforcement of a
premarital contract, but it does not follow that this probability
would be any higher than in the absence of enforcement. Judicial
enforcement of marital terms may not appeal to every couple considering marriage; however, courts should not impose their personal preferences or their assumptions about others' preferences on
parties who choose to use the courts for dispute resolution.7
SoSee generally Judith S. Wallerstein, Children After Divorce: Wounds That Don't
Heal, NY Times Magazine 19 (Jan 22, 1989).
70 Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (The Free Press, 1985).
" See p 285.
This comment assumes that both parties to the contract have equal bargaining power
and full knowledge. Objections to this assumption are based on the assertion that women, in
negotiating premarital agreements, in fact suffer from unequal bargaining power. Thus, the
argument goes, women may not enter these agreements voluntarily because they are illmatched in economic terms; in other words, they are economically and socially incapable of
choosing marriage, much less dictating the terms of a marriage.
13 Professor Shultz explores the role of conflict management and public dispute resolution in marriage, arguing that intimate relationships are open to far greater negotiation than
in the past when there was a more coherent social consensus on the meaning of marriage.
"
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The additional possibility that courts, by not enforcing premarital contracts, maintain (whether consciously or unconsciously)
the superior position of men within marriage is unacceptable.
Courts should be vigilant, rather than acquiescent, when confronted with any position that might perpetuate prescribed and
limited roles of men and women within marriage, particularly if
the state wishes to encourage marriage. Marriage will not be considered by women an attractive institution if it is perceived as outdated and constrictive of their freedom.7 4
Finally, in order to avoid interfering with ongoing marriages,
courts assume that most marriages will follow the pattern of the
husband as breadwinner and the wife as the caretaker of the home
and, therefore, that it is unnecessary to alter the traditional duties
of the partners. If, as is often the case today, the husband and wife
both work outside the home and contribute income, this assumption ignores a host of reasons why parties might want to make specific arrangements about finances or other matters.7"
A more severe criticism of this attitude is that it implicitly
devalues the work women do in the home. In the past, husbands
working outside the home were considered to be doing "real" work;
the money they earned was theirs to spend, even in the realm of
household expenditures, generally considered women's domain.76
Since we now not only recognize the economic value of housework, 77 but do not assume that it is a woman's duty, women who

For many reasons, contractual ordering may help to clarify the relationship for the parties;
the contract thus replaces social institutions such as churches, which once played a larger
role in defining and enforcing marital obligations. Shultz, 70 Cal L Rev at 307-28 (cited in
note 2).
" "Fostering equality between the sexes, maximizing individual freedom of choice for
men and women ... and helping to insure that both have equal opportunity to develop their
respective potential without being hindered by sex-stereotypic or otherwise unjustifiable
limitations should be among the objectives of American family law both in theory and as
applied." Lauerman, 56 U Cinn L Rev at 493 (cited in note 55). Of course, given inequalities
in the job market and the inevitable deterioration of women's economic and social status
after the failure of a marriage, the institution may remain attractive despite the inherent
inequalities. See Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences and Economic Rights, 1989 U Chi
Legal F 169 (for a discussion of gender inequalities in the job market); see generally Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (cited in note 70) (for an exploration of the effect of divorce
on women's economic status).
7' Furthermore, the assumption of the Mirizio court that children are the main reason
for marriage is outdated, particularly with respect to successive marriages between older
partners. See note 40 and accompanying text for discussion of the rationale in Mirizio.
76 Commonwealth v George, 358 Pa 118, 56 A2d 228, 230 (1948); Dobash and Dobash,
Violence Against Wives at 127-28 (cited in note 55).
" Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 127-30, 134-35 n 3 (Little, Brown and
Company, 3d ed 1986).
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manage the household are just as much candidates for premarital
contracts as those who work outside the home.78
III.

THE BENEFITS OF ENFORCING PREMARITAL CONTRACTS

Powerful reasons compel the enforcement of premarital agreements, the most important of which is to provide men and
women-but especially women-more freedom within marriage. A
legal document may make a woman's insistence on not occupying a
socially-prescribed role in the marriage more clear to her prospective spouse. 79 In addition, a contract specifying the parties' respective obligations to each other might check the problem of marked
behavioral changes that are triggered by marriage. Often, the man
is much more deferential to the woman's wishes before marriage
than he is after.80
The institution of marriage serves as an important component
of social organization. 8 Not only does society put pressure on people to marry but in many respects it stigmatizes unmarried people. 2 In view of the increasing numbers of people who object to
traditional marital roles, if marriage is to remain a building block
of society parties who choose to marry should be allowed to do so
7 Professor Lauerman suggests that the full-time homemaker is the woman who most

needs a premarital agreement, though she focuses most attention on the influence of the
agreement on the woman's position at dissolution of the marriage. No-fault divorce laws
may leave women a "Hobson's choice": They either must invest in a career, or choose fulltime mothering, with the possibility that the latter choice may work seriously to their detriment. The choice of motherhood is legitimate, and should be respected, not punished by the
law. Lauerman, 56 U Cinn L Rev at 510-11 n 66-67 (cited in note 55).
" Clearly, a woman could also choose to assume a traditional role in the marriage.
However, given social mores, a premarital agreement which merely assigns such a role seems
unnecessary, unless the couple wishes to assign it monetary value.
so Dobash and Dobash, Violence Against Wives at 82 (cited in note 55) ("[t]he patterns
during these three stages in the development of the couple's relationship [activities prior to
marriage, during the first year of marriage, and throughout the remaining years of married
life] illustrate quite dramatically how the woman is increasingly isolated, controlled and
restricted as the relationship becomes more permanent and as she takes on the status and
responsibilities of a wife").
8 In the realm of trusts and estates, for example, default provisions in statutes controlling the testamentary disposition of property focus on the decedent's surviving spouse. See
generally Uniform Probate Code § 2 (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 1982).
82 Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of UnmarriedPeople in American
Law, 30 Ariz L Rev 207, 214-19 (1988) (noting that the law's bias toward marriage discourages unmarried people from having children, including the adoption of children; federal
public housing regulations and local zoning ordinances requiring single-family dwellings may
work against unmarried people by preventing them from establishing a shared home; social
security laws distinguish beneficiaries on the basis of marriage; beneficiaries of intestate
succession are determined by marital status).
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on their own terms.
Two examples of possible premarital contracts containing provisions enforceable during marriage will help illustrate the regime
in which parties determine the terms of their marriages. 3 In the
first example, Fred and Sally, both college graduates, form a premarital agreement.84 Each is considering a graduate degree; each
values home and family. They agree that, at the outset, Sally will
manage the home while Fred pursues a career as a business executive. Fred plans to work for a few years before attending business
school; during that time Sally may pursue graduate work, or she
may work also. When Fred returns to business school, if there are
no children Sally will work to help support the couple. If Fred and
Sally have children by that time, Sally will continue her care of
them at home.
The couple also agrees that all earnings of either partner are
divisible in half. Neither one is bringing any significant property
into the relationship. The value of either spouse's full-time contribution to the home is a function of the other's earnings; in other
words, if Fred works while Sally takes care of the home, she is entitled to half his salary. After dividing the salary, Fred and Sally will
contribute equal amounts to the household expenses. These expenses include the repayment of educational loans of both partners, regardless of any disproportionality in the indebtedness of
the partners. Fred and Sally also agree to make equal contributions to a fund for the children's college education, in an amount
agreed upon mutually. Purchases of real property, or any purchase
for the home in excess of $5000 require the consent of both partners, and contribution to such purchases is to be made jointly.
Sally is assigned the main purchasing responsibility for the family,
subject to the above limit. Family vacations are to be planned and
paid for according to this same system.
Any money that Fred and Sally have left after payment of
household and other expenses is theirs to dispose of as they please.
They may choose, for example, to make joint investments, use the
money to help their respective families or spend it on personal
items.
83 These examples assume a jurisdiction which has adopted UPAA. For a discussion of
the enforcement provisions and limitations on enforceable contracts under UPAA, see pp
286-87. As noted earlier, not all married couples will wish to form premarital agreements for
the conduct of their marriages. These illustrations merely suggest situations in which premarital agreements might be desired by the parties.
8, Assume that the agreement is verified by attorneys selected independently by each
spouse and is also devoid of any traces of unconscionability, fraud or duress.
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Fred and Sally's agreement also provides for separate ownership of any property either of them may inherit. They further
agree that each will make a good faith effort to resolve disputes
arising in their marriage but not covered by the premarital agreement. If their own efforts fail, they must seek marriage counseling.
They agree to a period of trial separation of six months before either partner sues for divorce.
The conditions of their contract are enforceable, according to
its terms, in a court of law. If, for example, either partner makes
an unauthorized purchase, the other can seek a court order making
that partner solely liable for the cost. Fred or Sally may also seek a
court order if either fails to make the proper contribution to joint
purchases, household expenses or other delineated items.
Under the terms of this contract, Sally is assured that if she
chooses to stay in the home, her work will be valued the same as
Fred's work outside the home. She thus is recognized not only as
an economic equal in the marriage, but also as the primary decision maker in all matters regarding the home. If enforced during
the marriage, the premarital agreement provides her with significant bargaining power in the event of a dispute; she need not, like
many dependent homemakers, choose between acquiescence to her
husband's wishes or divorce. Instead, she can choose a third means
of dispute resolution pursuant to the terms of the contract.
The second example involves a second marriage for one of the
partners. Rob has never been married, while Susan was married for
11 years and has three children, ages 13, 10 and 8. Each partner
brings into the marriage property which is to remain entirely separate, as will each spouse's earnings. Both partners are currently
working outside the home and intend to continue to do so after the
marriage. All household expenses, including after-school childcare,
will be shared equally by Rob and Susan. The cost of educating
the children will also be shared equally.
Rob and Susan agree that the maintenance of the home will be
a joint effort. They will alternate responsibility for cooking, cleaning and shopping on a weekly basis. All duties involving the children are to be shared as well, including attendance at school functions, and overseeing the children's extracurricular activities. Rob
and Susan additionally agree to alternate the responsibility for
staying home from work to take care of a sick child.
At the time of contracting, Susan is uncertain about the health
and income of her mother, her only living parent, and wishes to
include a provision allowing for the support of her mother in the
event it becomes necessary. Rob agrees to share this responsibility
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by shouldering half the cost of her mother's care.
Rob and Susan's premarital contract is binding in all respects
in a court of law. In addition, they provide in the agreement that if
one partner fails to perform his or her household duties, the other
is entitled to hire a maid or housekeeper to fulfill those duties and
assess the cost to the other partner. Each partner may seek a court
order to compel the other to make financial contributions as required by the contract.
The agreement between Rob and Susan ensures that Rob will
contribute equally to the support of Susan's dependents: her children, and possibly her mother. By arranging these contributions in
advance to each partner's satisfaction, future problems are more
easily avoided."5 In addition, the provisions for maintenance of the
household make explicit the division of labor between Rob and Susan. Failure to adhere to these terms results in financial loss (for
example, paying a housekeeper) to the noncomplying partner in
question. This potential penalty emphasizes both the monetary
worth of traditionally undervalued household services and the importance of equal contributions by both spouses.
IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS DURING
MARRIAGE

A. Enforceability of Premarital Contracts
Disagreements between spouses covered by a premarital agreement need not always culminate in litigation. One advantage of the
marital freedom of contract regime is that it allows parties to
choose alternative means of dispute resolution. In the hypotheticals, for example, Fred and Sally are obligated by their contract to
see a marriage counselor; Rob and Susan's agreement essentially
provides for liquidated damages, in the form of payment for professional housekeeping services. Such alternatives to litigation are
neither uncommon nor discouraged in other contexts. 86 One would
expect, moreover, that parties to a premarital contract would not
only provide for nonlitigious ways of addressing breaches of the
*' Note that in the event of changed circumstances-for example, another member of
Susan's family agrees to contribute to the mother's support-Susan and Rob can amend
their contract after they are married to reflect these changes. See UPAA § 5 (which provides
for modification after marriage provided certain requirements are met). Even if Rob and
Susan neglect to modify the contract, a court, if faced with a dispute over a term rendered
impossible by the changed circumstance, can release the parties from their obligations under
the doctrine of impracticability. See p 304 for a discussion of equitable enforcement.
8' Shultz, 70 Cal L Rev at 207 (cited in note 2).
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agreement, but would try hard to resolve disputes without litigation whenever possible. The possibility of enforcement at a minimum ensures that each party will consider the other's complaint
seriously.
Although in many instances parties would resolve problems
without litigation, inevitably certain disputes would end up in
court. Since premarital agreements are already enforced at death
or divorce, courts are not without guidelines as to how to enforce
similar contracts during marriage. Premarital contracts which control the disposition of property at the termination of marriage are
in many ways similar to contracts which dictate the treatment of
property within the life of the marriage.
This is not to say that premarital agreements in general, and
those enforced during marriage in particular, warrant identical judicial treatment as "ordinary" contracts. But they should not be,
as they tend to be today, approached as conventional family law
questions. 7 Rather, courts should enforce premarital contracts by
using accepted principles of contract, 8 informed by and adjusted
for the similarities and differences between premarital and "ordinary" agreements.
As noted by Professor Younger, premarital agreements are different from "ordinary" contracts in three ways: subject matter of
the contract; the confidential relationship of the parties; and the
length of the contractual term." Because of these differences, she
suggests that premarital contracts present a "dilemma" for the
law: While prospective spouses should be able to make their own
bargains (subject to traditional rules of contract), the state has certain interests which may conflict with these private agreements.9 0
Presumably, the state interest will also vary according to whether
the premarital contract applies to an ongoing or dissolving
marriage.
However, premarital contracts are similar to ordinary contracts in that they are subject to the safeguards in traditional contract law against fraud and deceit. As a preliminary matter, premarital contracts, or agreements "made in contemplation of
marriage," are within the reach of the Statute of Frauds91 and thus

" See discussion at pp 301-05.
s8 Weitzman,

The Marriage Contract at 353-59 (cited in note 4).

" Younger, 40 Rutgers L Rev at 1061 (cited in note 11).

90 Id.
'I Rest (2d) of Contracts § 110(c).
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must be in writing.9 2 The contracting parties must have legal capacity to contract and must mutually assent to the bargain. 3 The
premarital contract, like any other, must be supported by consideration,94 though in most jurisdictions the marriage itself satisfies
this requirement.9 5 Despite the fact that premarital agreements are
created under many of the same restrictions as standard contracts,
courts that have reviewed the former for substantive and procedural fairness have strayed from traditional contract doctrine and
imported notions of fairness from family law. There is no need,
however, for courts to overlay family law principles of fairness onto
contract doctrine when dealing with premarital agreements. The
same interests the courts are trying to protect can be equally, and
more predictably, served by the exclusive application of contract
rules.
A recent Pennsylvania case offers an example of how the enforcement of premarital contracts according to notions of fairness
derived from family law can lead to incongruous and inconsistent
results. In In re Estate of Geyer,9 a widow attempted to exercise
her statutory right to a share of her deceased husband's testamentary estate, in spite of a premarital agreement specifying otherwise. 7 Both Mr. and Mrs. Geyer had been married and widowed
twice before. Mr. Geyer brought considerable wealth, including
real estate, to the marriage, while Mrs. Geyer had relatively few
assets. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, in order to invalidate the agreement, Mrs. Geyer had to show both that "the
agreement did not make reasonable provision for her, and that it
was entered into without full and fair disclosure by the decedent."9' 8 As stated, the court's conception of a fair premarital
agreement included the notion of "reasonable provision" for the
spouse, a notion more relevant in family law than in contract disputes.9 9 The court voided the agreement in part because of its fail" Some jurisdictions

impose other requirements such as notarization or acknowledge-

ment or execution of the agreement within a certain number of days before marriage. These

requirements may also be modified by state statutes regulating premarital agreements.
Rest 2d of Contracts § 12, 17.
" Rest 2d of Contracts § 71.
"

" Younger, 40 Rutgers L Rev at 1063 (cited in note 11).
516 Pa 492, 533 A2d 423 (1987).
" The premarital agreement provided that in the event of Mr. Geyer's death, Mrs.
Geyer would receive, out of his estate, only the family home and a lump sum of $20,000. Id
"

at 425.
" Id at 427 (emphasis omitted).
" The concept of adequate support and reasonable provision for a spouse guides family
law courts in determining such issues as the maintenance of a former spouse after divorce
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ure to make reasonable provision for Mrs. Geyer. 0 °
The court would have reached the same result had it applied
only contract principles and invalidated the agreement if "it was
entered without full and fair disclosure by the decedent."' 01 The
court noted that full and fair disclosure "must include the general
financial picture of the parties involved;'

0

2

indeed, the contract

specified that there had been full disclosure of assets. The trial
court found, however, that the decedent had misrepresented to
Mrs. Geyer his ownership of certain property. Given this misrepresentation, the contract was void. What this alternative analysis of
Geyer suggests is that the use of conceptions of fairness from family law may be unnecessary to, and may make more complicated
and unpredictable, the enforcement of premarital agreements.
As a general matter, a more consistent and predictable assessment of the fairness of a disputed premarital contract should go as
follows: In examining the procurement of the agreement, the court
should first consider the relationship of the parties. Under contract
law, prospective spouses stand in "such a relation of trust and confidence" as to expect disclosure. 03 In this context, parties are required not only to disclose but are also forbidden from failing to
04
disclose a known fact.'

Second, in evaluating the fairness of both procurement and
content of the premarital agreement, the court should apply doctrines of misrepresentation and unconscionability. Under the former doctrine, the contract may be voided whenever, upon examination of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract, the misrepresentation is found to be both fraudulent and

and the support of a child at divorce. See, for example, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
("UMDA") § 308 (Natl Conf of Commissioners on Uniform L 1970, as amended 1971, 1973)
(spousal maintenance determined according to the spouse's reasonable needs); UMDA § 309
(court may order payment of an amount "reasonable and necessary" for a child's support).
100 It is also worth noting that such a holding may have been inconsistent with the
intent of the parties at the time the contract was formed. While "reasonable provision" for
the widow was measured at the time of death of her spouse, the provisions in the contract
were shaped with her anticipated needs in mind.
101 Geyer, 533 A2d at 427 (emphasis omitted). As noted by a concurring judge in the
case, contracts not bargained for at arms length require heightened scrutiny. Id at 430.
102 Id at 429-30.
'o8 Rest 2d of Contracts, comment f to § 161. Thus, the duty of prospective spouses to
disclose does not rise to the level of parties in a fiduciary relationship. See Rest 2d of Contracts § 173 (parties in a fiduciary relationship must exercise "utmost good faith and full
and fair disclosure").
14 When the parties are in a "relation of trust and confidence," the nondisclosure of a
known fact may be equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist. Rest 2d of Contracts § 161.
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material. 0 5 Additionally, a premarital contract or term thereof
that is unconscionable at the time it was made may be voided. 06
The unconscionability of a contract is determined by inadequacy
of consideration, defects in the bargaining process, and other factors. More specifically:
... [G]ross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may
confirm indications that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion, or may show that the
weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the
0 7
unfair terms.
Finally, in enforcing premarital contracts, courts may be
guided by the related contract doctrines of undue influence" 8 or
duress. 0 9 In those states with statutes regarding premarital contracts, courts are further guided in their construction of these
agreements.110
Concededly, this marital freedom of contract regime would
work hardship on some parties. In the case of Gross v Gross,"' for
example, a woman signed a premarital agreement providing for
$200 per month in alimony in the event of divorce; at the time of
divorce, her husband's assets were valued at approximately
$8,000,00. ' " Although there was no evidence that the agreement
was in any way unfairly negotiated, the court held it void. Invoking
family law principles of fairness," 3 the court found the contract
unconscionable at the time it was executed because it would be
"significantly difficult" for the former wife to retreat from her "op-

10I

Rest 2d of Contracts § 162 (for the principle of misrepresentation); see generally

§ 159 et seq.

Rest 2d of Contracts § 208.
Rest 2d of Contracts comment d to § 208.
108 Rest 2d of Contracts § 177; see also E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts 268 (Little,
Brown and Co., 1982) ("[a] finding of undue influence is generally said to require a special
relation between the parties that makes one of them peculiarly susceptible to persuasion by
the other").
108Rest 2d of Contracts §§ 175, 176.
10 All states adopting the UPAA included the provision requiring full and fair disclosure of financial resources of both parties to a premarital agreement. (See note 23 and accompanying text). As noted earlier, it is unclear whether the UPAA allows or forbids enforcement of contracts during marriage. Assuming the UPAA would cover such enforcement, § 6
provides the circumstances under which contracts are voidable.
m 11 Ohio St 3d 99, 464 NE2d 500 (1984).
464 NE2d at 503.
106
'o

See pp 301-02 (discussing the use of fairness as defined by family law in Geyer).
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ulent standard of living."""4 Under a strict contract analysis, by
contrast, if this contract indeed was a fairly negotiated-that is,
without fraud, coercion or duress-the court would respect the
parties' allocation of risk. Accordingly, the court would uphold the
contract, to the woman's detriment.
Nonetheless, in many cases, contract doctrines such as mutual
mistake and impracticability may mitigate unjust results." 5 Under
the doctrine of mutual mistake, parties will not be held to a contract in which their bargain was based on erroneous assumptions
or misunderstandings."1 6 An example based on one of the hypothetical agreements discussed in Section III might be that Susan's
mother, unbeknownst to Susan and Rob when they made their
contract, was financially independent due to a large inheritance. A
court could refuse to enforce the provision regarding support of
Susan's mother on the ground that both parties were mistaken as
to her financial situation. The doctrine of impracticability"' would
prove important in the event of unanticipated and changed circumstances-for example, serious illness or accident suffered by
one of the parties to the agreement. Of course, a less drastic alternative to invalidation of the contract in such cases is modification
of the agreement.
It is unclear whether the principles borrowed from family law
truly advance the position of those they are meant to protect, at
least in the case of a contractual relationship. The premise of family law standards of fairness seems to be that women cannot bargain effectively with a prospective spouse. Although this supposition may be true in certain cases, such a generalization may
operate to harm other women. As noted by the dissent in Geyer:
"....

[W]e do not serve the cause of true equality by creating legal

fictions, even when those fictions are designed to protect against
...inequities. " 8
There is, moreover, a logical inconsistency in assuming that
women cannot bargain effectively (and thus the resulting contract
is unconscionable) and nonetheless enforcing the contracts that
emerge from unequal bargaining. The proposition that because of
economic and social disabilities women cannot press their own in'4464 NE2d at 510.
Weitzman, The Marriage Contract at 356-59 (cited in note 4).
, Rest 2d of Contracts § 152.
" Rest 2d of Contracts comment a to § 261 ("a principle broadly applicable to all
types of impracticability").
M Geyer, 533 A2d at 434.
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terests is a reasonable one, but demands a complete rejection of
premarital contracts rather than a partial one. To the extent such
agreements are enforced, they should be enforced as evenly and
predictably as possible. This is better achieved under a strict contract regime, which assumes equal bargaining power and thus discourages a paternalistic view of women. Under this regime, women
who choose to allow the state to "protect" them may do so by not
entering premarital agreements." 9
Enforcing premarital agreements upon termination of the
marriage, then, should be governed by the law of contracts, not an
amalgam of contract and family law. The arguments for a contract
regime apply to the enforcement of premarital contracts during
marriage as well as at the end of marriage. The enforcement of
these agreements in ongoing marriages according to traditional
contract principles achieves the dual purpose of effecting the intentions of the parties and alleviating concerns about the difficulties of enforcing obligations between spouses.
B. Remedies
Assuming a premarital agreement is enforceable, the question
becomes one of appropriate remedies for breach of the contract. 2 °
One of the less traditional remedies, but one which could be important in the context of premarital contracts, is enforcement of
arbitration awards granted pursuant to the terms of the spouses'
agreement. A couple might contract to submit to binding arbitration for certain disputes;' 2' clearly, this agreement is most effective
if the arbitration award is judicially enforceable. The court in
Avitzur upheld such an award, stating:
There can be little doubt that a duly executed antenuptial agreement, by which the parties agree in advance of
the marriage to the resolution of disputes that may arise
after its termination, is valid and enforceable. Similarly,
Again, this assumes that women who enter such agreements are making a meaningful choice. I am crediting women with the ability to bargain effectively and recognize
whether such agreements are in their best interest.
120 In general, a remedy is designed to protect any of three interests of the promisees:
the "expectation interest;" the "reliance interest;" or the "restitution interest." Rest 2d of
Contracts § 344. With these interests in mind, courts generally select among award of money
damages, specific performance or other less traditional remedies. Rest 2d of Contracts § 345.
121 See, for example, Avitzur v Avitzur, 58 NY2d 108, 446 NE2d 136, 137
(1983) (authorizing a religious tribunal to "counsel the couple in matters concerning their marriage"
and to "impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its
summons or to carry out its decision").
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an agreement to refer a matter concerning marriage to
1 22
arbitration suffers no inherent invalidity.
A second, and more conventional remedy, is that of damage
awards. Damages are easiest to assess with respect to monetary arrangements between the parties. For example, parties who had
agreed to make certain contributions to household or educational
expenses could show breach of contract by presenting accounting
records that evince inadequate payment by one party. The party
who did not follow the terms of the contract would be assessed
damages in the amount they failed to contribute, including some
calculation of interest the money would have earned.
Provisions for liquidated damages are particularly appropriate
in premarital contracts. These agreements lend themselves to liquidated damages clauses because proving loss under certain circumstances is very difficult. For instance, given an agreement allowing one spouse to choose where the couple lives, a breach of
that provision might best be remedied through liquidated damages, which the parties, rather than a court, assess according to
their subjective evaluation of the harm. The court's role is thus
limited to examining the relevant damages clause for reason12 3
ableness.
There are some limitations on remedies for breach of contracts
relating to the conduct of the parties during marriage. Punitive
damages generally are not awarded for breach of contract unless
the breach is also tortious. 12 1 Such claims seem unlikely, however,
by parties interested in continuing their relationships.
A court also will not order specific performance of a contract
for personal services. 2 5 If, for example, a couple agreed to certain
arrangements regarding household tasks, a suit for specific performance would have to be changed to one for monetary damages
owed by the breaching party. The enforcement of the contract in
this manner might awaken the breaching party to the value of the
contract and induce him or her to adhere to the bargain in the
future.
Although breaches of certain provisions of premarital agree122
123

Id at 138.
Liquidated damages must be reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss

caused by the breach, and the difficulty of proof of loss. Rest 2d of Contracts § 356. The
courts scrutinize very large amounts of damages to ensure they reflect these factors and are
not actually disguised penalties for breach of contract.
"" Rest 2d of Contracts § 355. An example in the context of premarital agreements is
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
"" Rest 2d of Contracts § 367.
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ments cannot be remedied with orders for specific performance,
there are instances in which specific performance might be appropriate. In Sanders, the court declared the premarital agreement
enforceable and ordered the husband to execute the will and convey the real estate as prescribed by the agreement. 2 6 The court
cautioned that specific performance is not a matter of right under
a contract, but is one .of judicial discretion. It is safe to assume,
therefore, that when dealing with the enforcement of premarital
contracts during marriage, judges, given their proven reluctance to
interfere with the marital relation, would rarely, if ever, grant specific performance.
CONCLUSION

One may conclude from the lack of cases seeking to enforce
premarital contracts during marriage either that there is no need
for judicial involvement in an ongoing marriage or that the certainty of losing such cases prevents them from ever being brought.
There are several reasons to believe the latter explanation. For
one, although premarital contracts have become more common in
recent years, 2 7 the dramatic rise in the number of agreements has
not generated a corresponding increase in the number of suits for
enforcement.
Even if, however, one assumes that premarital agreements regarding obligations during marriage have not been tested in court
by the parties' choice, it does not follow that such agreements must
never be enforced. Premarital contracts on the whole are consensual, voluntary agreements. Their enforcement imposes no burdens
on innocent or unsuspecting parties. Not everyone need make such
agreements, and those who choose not to remain unaffected. There
is no reason to assume that if parties to premarital agreements currently stay out of court by choice, self-regulation of these agreements will end once courts begin enforcing them during marriage.
Premarital contracts are subject to relatively strict contractual
construction, modified by dictates of statute. There remains, as in
the judicial enforcement of any contract, the possibility that the
contract may not be enforced on grounds of public policy. However, premarital contracts currently are subjected to unreasonable
126
117

Sanders v Sanders, 40 Tenn App 20, 288 SW2d 473 (1955).
Premarital agreements are the "growing trend." Lurvey, Premarital Agree-

ments-An Ounce of Prevention at 208 (cited in note 2). The New York Times reported
that premarital agreements are "proliferating" among the general populace. Claudia H.
Deutsch, PrenuptialDecrees Up, Prenuptial Trust Down, NY Times Cl (Nov 19, 1986).
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limitations grounded in outmoded conceptions of the nature of
marriage; removing these limitations, without sacrificing protection
of the parties' interests, is desirable and possible through the
adoption of the marital freedom of contract model.
Finally, allowing the enforcement of premarital contracts during marriage could enhance the institution itself by providing an
alternative mechanism for dispute resolution, an intermediate step
between the complete acquiescence of one party and divorce. Premarital contracts, if enforced during marriage, would help adapt
the institution of marriage to more accurately reflect today's
changing relations between men and women.

